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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-CLEAN WATER ACT-THE SUPREME
COURT SCALES BACK THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS' JURISDICTION
OVER "NAVIGABLE WATERS" UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT. Solid
Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159
(2001).
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1900 the United States Supreme Court stated, in reference to
wetlands, that "the police power is never more legitimately exercised
than in removing such nuisances."1 Since 1900, an appreciation for the
importance of wetlands 2 and the protection of our environment has
replaced this view, and as the national attitude has changed, so have the
laws that control activities that impact the environment. One of the
most important and sweeping environmental laws passed by Congress
was the Clean Water Act (CWA) of 1972,' which had several ambi-
tious goals, including the restoration of the integrity of the nation's
waters, protection of the animal and plant life in the waters, and, by
1985, elimination of pollutant discharge.4
In accordance with these policies, the United States Army Corps
of Engineers ("the Corps") has, since the 1970s, administered a permit
program commonly known as the section 404(a) program. This
program regulates the dredging or discharge of fill materials into
"navigable waters."5 Determining the type of waters to which the
Corps's authority should extend has made the section 404(a) permit
program one of the most controversial programs of the CWA. Since the
early 1800s, deciding just how broadly to interpret the term "navigable
waters" has been a bone of contention between supporters of a strong
federal government and proponents of states' rights, between entrepre-
neurs and environmentalists, and now, again, in an important holding
by the United States Supreme Court, between two branches of our
federal government; which two branches depends on how the case is
1. Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 636 (1900).
2. See the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Wetlands website and the
Sierra Club website for a general discussion of the role of wetlands in the environment
and the importance of preserving them. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of
Water, Wetlands, at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/ (revised Oct. 18, 2001); Sierra
Club, Clean Water and Wetlands, at http://www.sierraclub.com/wetlands/ (last visited
Nov. 8, 2001).
3. Federal Water Pollution Control Act and Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1377 (1994 &
Supp. V 1999)). This Act is more commonly known as the CWA. Id.
4. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994).




read: the Court and the administration, as represented by the Corps, or
the Court and Congress.
This note examines the United States Supreme Court's controver-
sial decision in Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers6 (Solid Waste), in which the Court struck down the "Migratory
Bird Rule"7 as an unauthorized extension of the authority given to the
Corps in the CWA. First, the note discusses the regulatory struggles
that began in the mid-1980s when a group of Illinois municipalities
sought to site a garbage dump on an abandoned gravel mine, and ended
in the Corps's decision that gave rise to Solid Waste. The note next
focuses on the historical development of federal authority over
navigation and water pollution, including the evolution of the definition
of "navigable waters," the history and development of the CWA, and
the history of the Corps's interpretation of the CWA. With this
groundwork laid, the note shifts to a discussion of recent decisions by
the Court that interpret the CWA and the Federal Commerce Clause
power on which congressional authority over navigation is based. Next,
the note examines the Court's reasoning in the Solid Waste opinion,
including its decision to refrain from extending its recent limitations on
the Commerce Clause. This section highlights the 5-4 conservative-
liberal split in the Court, currently familiar to legal scholars, which
gave rise to a deep contrast between the majority and minority
opinions. In conclusion, this note considers the impact that the Solid
Waste decision will have on environmental regulation, the potential for
further limitations on the Corps's authority over "navigable waters,"
and the possibility that even if Congress restores the Corps's authority
over isolated wetlands, the Supreme Court may decide to invalidate
Congress's actions on the grounds that they are limited by the Com-
merce Clause.
II. FACTS
In the mid-1980s the Chicago metropolitan area faced what was
reported as a major garbage disposal crisis.8 The Northwest Municipal
6. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
7. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg.
41,206, 41,216-17 (Nov. 13, 1986); see infra note 99 and accompanying text. For a
detailed discussion of this rule see infra Part III.A.3.
8. See, e.g., William Presecky, Governments Dig for Garbage Ideas, CHI. TRIB., Mar.
5, 1986, at Dl, available at 1986 WL 2651168. The Chicago metropolitan area generated
more than 6.25 million tons of garbage annually. id. The life expectancy of eight of the
twenty-three landfills in the area was estimated at two years or less. Id. Only six
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Conference (NMC), a group of twenty-seven north and northwest Cook
County suburbs, banded together to search for cost-effective solutions
to their waste management problems.9 In December 1985 the NMC
announced plans to build a balefill-which is a repository for garbage
previously compacted into blocks or bales-on an abandoned gravel
mine near the Cook County border.'
Over one-third of the 533-acre site had been strip-mined for gravel
and sand from the 1930s to the 1950s." Abandoned by 1960, the site
had gradually evolved into an "early successional stage forest," and the
ridges and trenches left by the mining had formed several acres of
permanent and seasonal ponds. 2 The NMC proposed to use 410 acres
of the site for the balefill 3 and to fill in 17.6 acres of the permanent and
seasonal ponds as part of the balefill's construction. 4 One hundred and
forty-two acres of the 410-acre parcel were designated to be used for
actual garbage disposal, with several acres of trees acting as a buffer
zone to the surrounding area. 5
landfills were expected to last over ten years. Id.
9. Id. The number of municipalities in the group has dropped from twenty-seven
to twenty-three. See Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 162-63.
10. Gary Wisby, Suburb Landfill Site Chosen: 29 Towns Select Former Strip Mine Near
Elgin, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 20, 1985, at 28, available at 1985 WL 3607433. A balefill
only accepts baled garbage, thereby saving space, eliminating loose garbage, and
minimizing odor and rodents. Id.
11. Petitioner's Brief at 4, Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (No. 99-1178).
12. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 163; Petitioner's Brief at 4, Solid Waste (No. 99-1178).
An "early successional stage forest" develops after an "opening occurs in a forest,
whether from fire, wind or human activity." Jonathan S. Linowes, Moulton Hill ls a
Thriving Young Forest Teeming with Wildlife, at http://www.linowes.com/forest/nature.htm
(last visited July 7, 2001). Characteristics of an early successional stage forest include
"low vegetation, dense cover and food for wildlife." Id. The term "succession" simply
indicates the natural patterns of change in an ecosystem over time. Plant Succession: How
a Field Becomes a Forest, at http://www.env.duke.edu/forest/sucession.htm (last updated
Apr. 5, 2000). The ponds on the site range from under one-tenth of an acre to several
acres in size and from several inches to several feet in depth. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at
163.
13. Petitioner's Brief at 4, Solid Waste (No. 99-1178).
14. Wayne Baker, Balefill Opponents Flood Army Corps, CHI. TRIB., May 17, 1993,
at D3, available at 1993 WL 11071357. In its first permit application to the Army Corps
of Engineers, NMC indicated that it planned to fill in thirty-one acres of wetlands, but
scaled that back to 17.6 acres in its second application in response to the Corps's
criticisms of the plan. See id.
15. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, Northwest Cook County Balefll,
at http://www.swancc.orgfbalefill.htm (last visited June 16, 2001).
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Under a 1981 Illinois law, 6 the NMC had to receive local
government approval for the siting of the landfill and state government
approval for its design before construction could begin.' 7 In 1987,
NMC applied to the Cook County Zoning Board of Appeals (CCZB)
for a special use planned unit development permit for the balefill. 8
After fifty-eight hours of hearings, the CCZB unanimously recom-
mended approval of the balefill site to the Cook County Board of
Commissioners (CCBC), which approved the plan with a seventy-five
percent majority in November 1987.19
CCBC conditioned its approval on the subsequent approval of the
Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA),2 ° and in November
1988, the NMC, now incorporated and renamed the Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC), submitted a 1,600 page
application to the IEPA.2' The IEPA rejected the first application, and
SWANCC resubmitted with several design changes.22  The IEPA
approved the second plan in November 1989 with fifty-one conditions
relating to the construction, operation, and monitoring of the balefill.
23
The final hurdle that SWANCC had to cross in order to begin construc-
tion was approval by the Corps to fill the ponds on the site.24 In April
16. 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15/2 (West 1997).
17. Id; see Petitioner's Brief at 5-6, Solid Waste (No. 99-1178).
18. Petitioner's Brief at 5, Solid Waste (No. 99-1178). Initially, the NMC sought to
have the site annexed by the nearby village of Bartlett. T.J. Rolando Jr., The Case Against
Bartlett Balefill, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 27, 1986, at C8, available at 1986 WL 2735403. After
facing strong opposition to the project from neighboring suburbs and being rejected by
the Bartlett Zoning Board, the NMC turned to the CCZB with its balefill proposal. See
id.
19. Steve Johnson, Cook County Gives Green Light to Controversial Landfill, CHI.
TRB., Nov. 17, 1987, at Cl, available at 1987 WL 2996703. "Members of the Cook
County Zoning Board of Appeals . . . praised the design as being among the safest
they'd ever seen" while opponents of the project claimed it endangered the Newark
Valley aquifer from which many surrounding towns drew their water. Id.
20. Id.
21. See Stevenson Swanson, Balefill Plan to Guarantee Land Values, CHI. TRIB., Nov.
23, 1988, at Cl, available at 1988 WL 3531545. The plan was the first landfill plan in
Illinois to propose setting up funds to guarantee property values and water quality. Id.
22. Petitioner's Brief at 6, Solid Waste (No. 99-1178). Design changes included a
more comprehensive monitoring system for ground water, the redesign of a system to
collect liquid waste, and a more substantial clay liner to protect the aquifer beneath the
site from decomposing waste. Mike Nichols, Foes of Balefill Fight New Plan: Waste
Agency Revises Its Proposal, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 19, 1989, at C4, available at 1989 WL
4625351.
23. Petitioner's Brief at 6, Solid Waste (No. 99-1178).
24. Stevenson Swanson, State OKs New Suburb Landfill: Opponents Call Action




1986 and March 1987, the Corps, at SWANCC's request for a ruling,
disclaimed jurisdiction over the proposed balefill site, finding that there
was no need for a section 404(a) permit 5 to discharge fill material into
navigable waters because navigable waters were not present.26
However, in July 1987, the Illinois Nature Preserves Commission told
the Corps that migratory birds had been seen on the balefill site.27
Pursuant to the Migratory Bird Rule,28 in November 1987, the Corps
asserted jurisdiction over the balefill because: (1) the site was aban-
doned; (2) it developed a natural character; and (3) the waters on the
site were or could be used by migratory birds that cross state lines.
29
In February 1990, SWANCC submitted its first section 404(a)
permit application to the Corps.3° The Corps denied SWANCC's
application on the grounds that the balefill would damage the site's
wetlands and that SWANCC had not proven that the site was the "least
damaging practicable alternative site.' SWANCC attempted to
25. Section 404(a) of the CWA gives the Corps the authority over the discharge of
fill material. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994). Section 404(a) states that the Corps of
Engineers "may issue permits ... for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters." Id.
26. Petitioner's Brief at 8, Solid Waste (No. 99-1178); see Solid Waste Agency v.
United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 164 (2001). The Corps based its
initial conclusion that it did not have jurisdiction on the fact that no wetlands or areas
supporting plant life typically found in saturated soil conditions were present on the
site. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 164. The Clean Water Act defines "navigable waters" as
"waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994).
The Corps's regulatory definition of "waters of the United States" includes "intrastate
lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands,
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use,
degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce." 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2001).
27. Respondent's Brief at 7-8, Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (No. 99-1178); see also Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 164.
Subsequent observations revealed 121 different species of birds on the balefill site,
including migratory birds such as "mallard ducks, wood ducks, Canada geese,
sandpipers, kingfishers, water thrushes, swamp [sparrows], red-winged blackbirds,. tree
swallows, and several varieties of herons." Respondent's Brief at 7, Solid Waste (No. 99-
1178). Also observed at the site was the second-largest colony of great blue herons in
northeastern Illinois, and the Veery and Cooper's Hawk, both of which are on the
threatened or endangered list of the Illinois Endangered Species Protection Board. Id.
28. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg.
41,206, 41,216-17 (Nov. 13, 1986). The Migratory Bird Rule asserted the Corps's
jurisdiction over intrastate waters used by migratory birds and endangered species. Id.;
see infra note 99 and accompanying text; infra Part III.A.3 (discussing rule in detail).
29. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 164-65.
30. Petitioner's Brief at 9, Solid Waste (No. 99-1178).
31. Id. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service and EPA both recommended
that the Corps reject the permit application because of the balefill's effect on the habitat
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address the Corps's criticisms when it resubmitted a significantly
revised section 404(a) permit application to the Corps.32 However, in
July 1994 the Corps again rejected SWANCC's application, finding the
balefill was against the public interest on three grounds: (1) the
"unmitigable" impact of site development on migratory birds and other
wildlife; (2) SWANCC had not sufficiently demonstrated that it had
examined all of the less environmentally damaging available alterna-
tives to the landfill; and (3) the project created an unacceptable risk of
groundwater contamination.33
SWANCC responded to this second denial from the Corps by
filing a lawsuit in federal district court asking the court to overturn the
Corps's permit denial.34 The first theory that SWANCC put forward to
support its position was that the Corps's decision to deny the request
and wildlife of the site. Stevenson Swanson, US. Agency Says Balefll Would Damage
Wildlife, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 16, 1990, at M3, available at 1990 WL 2914829; Stevenson
Swanson & Mike Comerford, EPA Sides with Foes of Balefll, CHI. TRIB., May 1, 1990,
at Cl, available at 1990 WL 2918160. However, in a report to Congress, totally
inconsistent with its subsequent ruling on SWANCC's section 404(a) permit, the Corps
found that there was little risk of contamination to the Newark Valley Aquifer from the
balefill. See Gilbert Jimenez, Bartlett Waste Site No Risk, Army Says, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May
12, 1990, at 41, available at 1990 WL 4399468. The Corps even found that
"SWANCC's project 'is not contrary to the public interest because [its communities]
need a solid waste disposal facility' and 'the project's reasonably foreseeable benefits
outweigh its foreseeable detriments."' Petitioner's Brief at 9, Solid Waste (No. 99-1178).
32. See Petitioner's Brief at 10, Solid Waste (No. 99-1178). Revision of the
application included measures such as the reduction of the number of acres to be
"filled" from thirty-one to 17.6 acres; a proposal to mitigate the loss of the wetlands by
the creation of 17.6 acres of replacement waters on the site; relocation of a great blue
heron rookery on the site; spreading construction over a fifteen year period to minimize
disturbance to the site's wildlife; and the purchase and dedication of 258 acres of land
next to the property as a forest preserve. Id. at 5.
33. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 165; Petitioner's Brief at 10, Solid Waste (No. 99-1178).
The Corps conducted this special groundwater study because of an amendment to the
1988 Army Corps of Engineers appropriation bill that required the Corps to conduct a
study of the impact of the balefill on the Newark Valley Aquifer before issuing a
section 404(a) permit. Water Resources Development Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
676, § 47(b), 102 Stat. 4012 (1988); see also discussion of report findings, supra note 31.
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service later reversed its position on the project
and found that the SWANCC's mitigation efforts overcame the project's detriments and
recommended permit approval. Martha Russis, 2nd Round of Balefill Battle Set, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 28, 1993, at NW1, available at 1993 WL 11108000. The EPA, on the other hand,
reiterated its disapproval of the project to the Corps. Sue Ellen Christian, U.S. EPA
Against Plan for Balefill, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 10, 1993, at Dl, available at 1993 WL
11092630.
34. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 998 F. Supp. 946,
948 (N.D. Ill. 1998), affid, 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
The district court had jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2000). Id.
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was arbitrary and capricious.35 SWANCC's second theory was that the
Corps did not have jurisdiction over the waters on the site because the
Migratory Bird Rule is an unconstitutional extension of the Commerce
Clause36 power, a faulty interpretation of the CWA, and was adopted
by the Corps without the proper notice and comment periods mandated
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).37 The district court
granted summary judgment to the Corps on the issue of jurisdiction and
held that the Migratory Bird Rule was a constitutional extension of the
Corps's jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause; that the rule was a
permissible construction of the CWA; and that the notice and comment
requirements of the APA did not apply to the rule.3' Afterwards,
SWANCC voluntarily dismissed its other claims to pursue an appeal
solely on the issue of jurisdiction.39
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court's ruling.4 SWANCC appealed again, and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the matter.4
In Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,42 the Court
reversed the Seventh Circuit decision and held that the Corps, under its
regulation defining "waters of the United States,"'43 as it was clarified
by the Migratory Bird Rule and as applied to the SWANCC balefill,
exceeded the authority granted to it by Congress under section 404(a)
of the CWA.44
35. Solid Waste, 998 F. Supp. at 949. As the court noted in Solid Waste, "a final
agency decision is entitled to a 'presumption of regularity."' Id. at 952. A court must
uphold an agency decision unless the decision contains clear errors in judgment or it
was not based on a consideration of the relevant factors. Id. at 952-53. Any reasonable
decision by an agency will be affirmed. See id. at 953.
36. See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
37. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
38. Solid Waste, 998 F. Supp. at 957.
39. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 191 F.3d 845, 846
(7th Cir. 1999), affg 998 F. Supp. 946 (N.D. Ill. 1998), rev'd, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
40. Id. at 847.
41. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 529 U.S. 1129
(2000).
42. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
43. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2001).




A. Historical Overview of Federal Power over Navigation and Water
Pollution
Congressional authority over navigation and water pollution is
based on the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution,
which gives Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."'45
The Supreme Court found that constitutional authority over commerce
includes navigation, and therefore, the Constitution implicitly grants
Congress the power to regulate navigation.46  The Court firmly
established this proposition early in the nineteenth century when it
upheld the supremacy of a federal coasting trade statute over a New
York law that restricted steamboat access to New York ports.
47
Subsequent case law supported the notion that federal power over
navigation reigned supreme over state law.48 In the 1972 CWA and its
1977 amendments, Congress affirmed the federal supremacy over
navigation and "navigable waters" for a new purpose: controlling
pollution.49 The Corps further extended federal authority when it
promulgated the Migratory Bird Rule in 1986.50 Federal power over
navigation before 1972 will be discussed first, followed by a discussion
of the 1972 CWA and its 1977 amendments, and closing with a
discussion of the 1986 Migratory Bird Rule.
45. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
46. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193 (1824). The Court also found
that commerce "among the states" does not end at each state's boundary. Id. at 194. The
Court held that, as a result, Congress had the power to regulate internal navigation in
the states so long as it concerned commerce "among the states." Id. at 197.
47. See id. at l.
48. Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865) (holding that power to
regulate navigation extends to all navigable waters in a state reachable from another
state).
49. See Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 174-175 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also infra Part
I.A.2.




1. Assertion of Federal Power over Navigation and Pollution Before
1972
In the 1870 decision The Daniel Ball,5 the United States Supreme
Court fashioned a definition of navigable waters on which the modem
understanding of the term was built." The Court defined navigable
waters as waters, navigable in fact, which could be used as highways
for commerce. 3 Navigable waters of the United States were distin-
guished from navigable waters of the states, over which the United
States had no jurisdiction, because those of the United States form, by
themselves or by uniting with other waters, a highway over which
commerce with other states or foreign countries can be accomplished.54
Applying the definition, the Court held that a vessel, which operated
solely within the boundaries of the state of Michigan, was subject to
federal licensing provisions for steamships." The Court decided this
because while the ship only operated in the state, it carried goods that
had been or would be transported between states and because it
operated on a navigable water of the United States by which the ship
could have transported the goods to another state. 6
Over time the Court expanded this definition to apply to all but
the most insignificant bodies of water.57 In The Montello," navigable
waters were stretched to include not only waters in actual commercial
use, but also waters that could potentially be used in commerce. 9 The
51. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
52. See id.
53. Id. at 563. The Court defined navigable waters as:
[those waters] which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact
when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may
be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.
Id.
54. Id The Court distinguished the navigable waters of the United States from
those of the states in the following statement:
And they constitute navigable waters of the United States within the meaning
of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the
States, when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by
uniting with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or
may be carried on with. other States or foreign countries in the customary
modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.
Id.
55. See id. at 566.
56. Id. at 565.
57. United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 670 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
58. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874).
59. Id. at 441-42. In this case, the Court found that, even though the river in
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1921 decision in Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States6" further
defined navigable waters to include bodies of water used in the past for
commerce even though the present status of the water precluded a
commercial use. 1 Subsequent growth of the definition established that
if reasonable improvements could make it navigable, a waterway was
considered navigable-in-fact.
62
In contrast to its expansion of the definition of navigable
waterways, in Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch,63 the Supreme Court
recognized the limits of United States common law and held that there
was no federal common law that banned obstructions of navigable
rivers.64 This prompted Congress to enact the 1890 precursor of what
would become the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899
(RHA). 65 The RHA asserted the federal power over obstructions that
affect the navigability of waters.66 In section 13 of the RHA (commonly
question had to be improved to accommodate "modem" commercial vessels (i.e., sail
and steam boats), it had been used in its natural state by other types of vessels. Id. The
level of difficulty these "other" vessels encountered in navigating the river was not
relevant as to whether it was navigable-the fact that the vessels actually used the river
was the only fact relevant in determining navigability. Id.
60. 256U.S. 113 (1921).
61. Id. The river in Economy Light & Power Co. was used in the fur trade until about
1825, after which changes in drainage in the area and the construction of several dams
on the river had rendered the river unnavigable in practice. Id. at 118. However, the
Court found that even with the changes the river retained its original status as a
navigable river. Id. at 123.
62. United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 407-08 (1940).
The Court's test to determine if improvements were reasonable balanced cost against
need "at a time when the improvement would be useful." Id. For instance, the Court
noted that the millions of dollars that would be required to make the Rio Grande
navigable in fact made such improvements impracticable, and therefore the river could
not be considered navigable. Id. at 407 n.26.
63. 125 U.S. 1(1888).
64. Id. at 8. In this case appellees sued to keep a bridge from being constructed on
the Willamette River by the Willamette Iron Bridge Company. Id. at 2-3. They
contended that a federal law, which declared that all navigable waters of Oregon should
be available for interstate commerce, precluded the state from authorizing obstructions
to be built in navigable waters, and, therefore, the state law authorizing construction of
the bridge over the Willamette River was in violation of the federal act. Id. at 7-8. The
Court agreed with appellants, however, and found that the federal law in question only
asserted congressional authority to prohibit laws by the State of Oregon that would
hamper freedom of commerce between the several states. Id. at 12.
65. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 485-86 (1960); see Rivers
and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1994)).
66. 33 U.S.C. § 407; Sam Kalen, Commerce to Conservation: The Call for a National




known as the Refuse Act), Congress made it illegal to dump refuse into
navigable waters and their tributaries and gave the Corps the authority
to regulate discharges into navigable waters.67 The Refuse Act, on its
face, gives the Corps substantial power over navigable waters, but until
the 1960s, that power was only exercised in reviews of the impact of
discharges into navigable waters on navigation.68
In the 1960s, in two decisions,6 9 the Supreme Court signaled the
beginning of the process of transforming the Refuse Act from a
navigation regulation statute into a pollution regulation statute. 70 Both
cases utilized an expanded definition of refuse to create a pollution-
fighting tool out of the Refuse Act.7 l In 1969 the polluted Cuyahoga
River in Cleveland, Ohio, caught fire, and national attention focused on
pollution and on finding solutions to regain clean air and water in the
United States.72 By 1970 the Corps was committed to an environmental
permit program governing discharges into navigable waters.73
In the face of the Corps's permit program commitment, the Nixon
administration issued an executive order in 197074 to implement a
Refuse Act Permit Program in accordance with section 13 of the
67. 33 U.S.C. § 407. The statute reads:
It shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit ... any refuse matter of
any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and
sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water of
the United States, or into any tributary of any navigable water from which the
same shall float or be washed into such navigable water; and it shall not be
lawful to deposit . . . material of any kind in any place on the bank of any
navigable water, or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water,
where the same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water ...
whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed . . . [a]nd
provided further, That the Secretary of the Army, whenever in the judgment
of the Chief of Engineers anchorage and navigation will not be injured
thereby, may permit the deposit of any material above mentioned in
navigable waters.
Id.
68. Michael C. Blumm & D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection Under the
Clean Water Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension, anda Callfor Reform,
60 U. COLO. L. REv. 695, 701 (1989).
69. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966) (holding commercially
valuable substances such as oil could be considered refuse); United States v. Republic
Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960) (holding industrial solid waste is refuse).
70. Kalen, supra note 66, at 880-81.
71. Standard Oil, 384 U.S. at 228-30; Republic Steel, 362 U.S. at 489-92.
72. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159,
174-75 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Kalen, supra note 66, at 883.
74. Exec. Order No. 11574, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,627 (Dec. 23, 1970).
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RHA.75 Within a year, a federal district court ended the newborn
program when it found that the Refuse Act did not provide for the
issuance of permits for discharges into non-navigable waters, and
determined that the permit program was therefore invalid.76 A new
solution was called for, and in 1972 the CWA was born.
77
2. The Clean Water Act of 1972 and Its 1977 Amendments
The 1972 CWA represents a defining moment in environmental
legislation in the United States. 78 The CWA was a comprehensive water
pollution regulation measure that had as a goal the total elimination of
the discharge of pollutants into water by 1985. 79 Another stated goal
was to achieve, by 1983, water quality sufficient to protect and nurture
fish, shellfish, and wildlife and to provide the opportunity for water
recreation.80 Also included in the Act's policy statement was the
congressional intent "to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate
pollution, [and] to plan the development and use . . . of land and water
resources."
81
For the purpose of the CWA, "navigable waters" are defined as
"waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." 82 The
legislative history indicates that the omission of the word "navigable"
75. See Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 178 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra note
67.
76. Kalurv. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 10-11 (D.D.C. 1971).
77. See Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 174-75 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Federal
Water Pollution Control Act and Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1377 (1994 & Supp. V 1999)).
The CWA has its roots in the mid-twentieth century in Congress's first attempt to
regulate water pollution-the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948-which
reflected a growing awareness in the United States about the problem of water
pollution. Kalen, supra note 66, at 877-79 & n.29. The statute was enacted as an
"exercise of jurisdiction over the waterways of the Nation and in consequence of the
benefits resulting to the public health and welfare by the abatement of stream
pollution." Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 756, 62 Stat. 1151 (1948). This
early version of the Act defined "interstate waters" as "all rivers, lakes, and other waters
that flow across, or form a part of, State boundaries." Id. Subsequent amendments to the
Act followed the lead of the RHA and established the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act jurisdiction over "navigable waters." Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 178 n.5 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
78. See Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 175 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79. Id.; see 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).
80. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2).
81. Id. § 1251(b).
82. Id. § 1362(7).
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from the definition was deliberate and that Congress intended "that the
term 'navigable waters' be given the broadest possible constitutional
interpretation."83 In matters of refuse discharge, the CWA retained the
old RHA provision that made the discharge of refuse illegal, but the
Act also created a new permit program-commonly referred to as the
section 404(a) permit program-administered by the Corps for the
discharge of dredge and fill material into navigable waters."
After passage of the CWA, the Corps initially interpreted
navigable waters in a manner consistent with the treatment of the term
under the RHA."5 The Corps issued regulations that defined "navigable
waters of the United States" as "those waters of the United States
which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are presently,
or have been in the past .. .use[d] for purposes of interstate or foreign
commerce."8 6 Further, in determining whether a body of water is used
for interstate commerce, "it is the water body's capability of use by the
public for purposes of transportation or commerce which is the
determinative factor, and not the time, extent or manner of that use. ,87
The EPA disagreed with this geographically-based interpretation
as too narrow to achieve the intended purpose of the CWA,8 and so did
the courts.89 As a result, in 1975, the Corps promulgated interim
regulations that defined "waters of the United States" to include
navigable waters and their tributaries and "nonnavigable intrastate
waters whose use or misuse could affect interstate commerce." 90 With
83. S. CONF. REP. NO. 92-1236, at 144 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3822.
84. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1994); id. § 1344(a) (1994); see supra notes 25, 64-66 and
accompanying text.
85. See 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1) (1974); id § 209.260(e)(1).
86. Id. § 209.120(d)(1). Section 209.120 refers the reader to section 209.260 for a
more complete definition of the term. Id.
87. Id. § 209.260(e)(1).
88. See Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 183 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Walter G.
Wright, Jr. & Albert J. Thomas III, The Federal/Arkansas Water Pollution Control
Programs: Past, Present, and Future, 23 U. ARK. LITLE ROCK L. REv. 541, 600-01 (2001),
for a discussion of EPA's definition of "navigable waters."
89. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.
1975). The court held that by defining "navigable waters" as it did, the CWA "asserted
federal jurisdiction over the nation's waters to the maximum extent permissible under
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution" and that, therefore, "the term is not limited
to the traditional tests of navigability." Id. at 686. The court also found that the Corps
acted unlawfully and contrary to its duties under the CWA by adopting the definition
of navigability found in 33 C.F.R. §§ 209.210(d)(1) and 209.260. Id.
90. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 184 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The interim regulations
phased in the Corps's control over "waters of the United States" over three years: phase
one addressed navigable waters covered by the 1974 regulation and the RHA; phase
two included "nonnavigable tributaries, freshwater wetlands adjacent to primary
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some changes, these regulations were made final in 1977 just before
the consideration and passage of several amendments to the CWA.9
The 1977 amendments to the CWA made significant changes to
the section 404(a) permit program but did not change the definition of
"navigable waters."92 Many legislators expressed concern about the
broad powers given to the Corps to regulate isolated wetlands and
intrastate waters under the CWA's definition of navigable waters and
under the section 404(a) program.93 The House of Representatives
version of the bill redefined navigable waters and would have severely
limited the Corps's section 404(a) permit power.94 The Senate ap-
proached the issue from a different direction, and, while it did not
redefine navigable waters, it did approve certain exemptions to section
404(a) jurisdiction and approved a program to allow states to take
control of the dredge and fill permitting process.95 In the final Confer-
ence Committee version of the bill, Congress declined to change the
CWA definition of navigable waters but did adopt the proposed Senate
exemptions and a program to allow states to take over the dredge and
navigable waters, and lakes"; and phase three included all other waters covered under
the statute such as "intermittent rivers, streams, tributaries, and perched wetlands that
are not contiguous or adjacent to navigable waters." Id. Also included in phase three
were any waters that the Corps determined needed to be regulated to ensure water
quality. Id.
91. See id. at 186-87; 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (a)(3) (2001); see also supra note 26.
92. Kalen, supra note 66, at 897-98; see supra note 26.
93. See 123 CoNG. REC. S26710-29 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1977); 123 CONG. REC.
H10424-32 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1977).
94. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-830, at 59 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4424, 4433. That bill, H.R. 3199, defined navigable waters as "those waters which, are
presently used or are susceptible to use in their present condition or with reasonable
improvement to transport interstate or foreign commerce." Id.
95. S. REP. No. 95-370, at 75-78 (1977) reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, 4400-
03. Exemptions approved included exceptions for seeding, cultivating, and harvesting;
upland construction of soil and water conservation measures; the construction or
maintenance of farm or stock ponds, the construction and maintenance of agricultural




fill permit process for "Phase Two" and "Phase Three" waters.9 6 After
the 1977 CWA amendments, courts consistently ratified the Corps's
jurisdiction over isolated wetlands and intrastate bodies of water. 97 In
1986 the Corps gave the courts additional fodder by adding a new
"clarification" to its definition of navigable waters by promulgating the
Migratory Bird Rule.98 The Migratory Bird Rule extended section
404(a) jurisdiction to intrastate waters:
(1) Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected
by Migratory Bird Treaties; or
(2) Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds
which cross state lines; or
(3) Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered species;
or
(4) Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.99
3. The Migratory Bird Rule
The Corps established the Migratory Bird Rule as a clarification
of its definition of the navigable waters over which it had jurisdiction
96. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-830, at 60-63 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4424, 4437; see supra note 90 (defining "phase two" and "phase three" waters). The new
provisions of the dredge and fill permit program were codified under section 1344 of
the United States Code. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)-(g) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). The
codification of the provision by which a state could take control of portions of the
dredge and fill permit program gave the states potential power over navigable waters
"other than those waters which are presently used, or are susceptible to use in their
natural condition or by reasonable improvement as a means to transport interstate or
foreign commerce, . . . including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide.., including wetlands adjacent thereto." Id. § 1344(g)(1).
97. See, e.g., Quivira Mining Co. v. United States EPA, 765 F.2d 126 (10th Cir.
1985) (holding "arroyos" or gullies to be within the meaning of waters of the United
States); Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding an intrastate lake subject
to Corps's jurisdiction because it was used for interstate commerce); Wyoming v.
Hoffman, 437 F. Supp. 114 (D. Wyo. 1977) (affirming that Corps's jurisdiction extends
beyond traditional tests of navigability); cf United States v. City of Fort Pierre, South
Dakota, 747 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1984) (denying jurisdiction to the Corps over wetland
created as by-product of ordinary river maintenance).
98. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg.
41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
99. Id. The rule had previously been adopted and codified as a formal regulation
for EPA use only. See id; 40 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2001). The Corps opted, however,
not to formally adopt the rule as a regulation, but rather to treat it as a memorandum for
clarification of its codified definition of navigable waters. See Final Rule for Regulatory
Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. at 41,217.
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under the CWA. 1'° It first appeared as a Corps rule in the preamble to
the recodification of its definition of navigable waters."' The rule
asserted the Corps's jurisdiction over intrastate waters used, or which
could be used, by migratory birds and endangered species. °2 The idea
behind the rule was that objects of commercial activity, which in the
aggregate would affect interstate commerce, were sufficient to invoke
the Corps's jurisdiction under the CWA. 13
Environmentalists have supported the rule as much needed
protection for shrinking United States wetlands."' Until Solid Waste, the
courts also have approved the Corps's interpretation of the CWA as
encompassing the Migratory Bird Rule.' °5 Generally they have based
their decisions on a finding that Congress intended the Corps to have
jurisdiction over isolated wetlands under the CWA and that this
jurisdiction is valid under federal commerce power. 0 6 In Leslie Salt Co.
v. United States,' 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that "[t]he commerce clause power, and thus the Clean
Water Act, is broad enough to extend the Corps' jurisdiction to local
waters which may provide habitat to migratory birds and endangered
100. Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 164
(2001); see supra note 26; see also supra note 99 and accompanying text.
101. Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg.
at 41, 217.
102. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 164.
103. See generally Dennis J. Priolo, Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: The Case for
Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction over Isolated Wetlands, 30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 91
(1995).
104. Elizabeth Ann Glass Geltman, Regulation of Non-Adjacent Wetlands Under Section
404 of The Clean Water Act, 23 NEw ENG. L. REv. 615, 620 (1988-89); see also Edward
Alburo Morrissey, The Jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act over Isolated Wetlands: The
Migratory Bird Rule, 22 J. LEGIS. 137 (1996).
105. E.g., Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. United States EPA, 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993)
(holding that presence of migratory birds meets interstate commerce requirement);
Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding Corps's
jurisdiction over salt pits based on Migratory Bird Rule valid); United States v.
Hallmark Constr. Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d. 1069 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding Migratory Bird
Rule valid under Commerce Clause and the CWA). Contra United States v. Wilson, 133
F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding Corps's regulation defining "waters of the United
States" invalid). Legal scholars have also closely scrutinized the rule and the expansion
of regulatory power over isolated wetlands. See Morrissey, supra note 104, at 137-38;
Priolo, supra note 103, at 96-98; Stephen Jay Stokes, Note, The Limit of Government's
Regulatory Authority over Non-Adjacent Wetlands: Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 15
ENERGY L.J. 137 (1994).
106. See Hoffmnan Homes, 999 F.2d 256; Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d 354; Hallmark Constr.,
14 F. Supp. 2d. 1069.
107. 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990).
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species."' 8 Similarly, in Hoffnan Homes, Inc. v. EPA,'0 9 the court held
that a potential or minimal connection to interstate commerce, like the
possible presence of migratory birds, is sufficient to establish the
Corps's jurisdiction over a property." Recently, however, a dissenting
voice was heard from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in United States v. Wilson,1 1' which found that the Migratory Bird
Rule might exceed the limits of Federal Commerce Clause power and
that the rule did exceed the authority Congress granted the Corps under
the CWA.112
B. Recent Developments Indicating the Limitation of the Corps's
Power over Navigation Through Interpretation of the CWA and
Limitation of Federal Commerce Clause Power
Since 1985, the United States Supreme Court has made some
significant decisions that are relevant to any discussion of Solid Waste.
First, United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.," 3 an important Court
decision interpreting the Corps's authority under the CWA, will be
briefly examined. A review of two important cases limiting Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause will follow: United States v.
Lopez' and United States v. Morrison."5
1. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.
The Supreme Court sent a message to supporters and opponents
of federal regulation of wetlands in United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc.'1 6 At issue in Riverside Bayview was whether or not the Corps
had correctly interpreted its statutory authority when it defined
navigable waters and waters of the United States to include wetlands
108. Id. at 366. At issue in this case was the Corps's jurisdiction over seasonally
filled abandoned salt pits adjacent to the San Francisco National Wildlife Refuse and
within a quarter of a mile of Newark Slough, a tidal arm of the San Francisco Bay. Id.
at 355-56.
109. 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
110. Id.at261.
111. 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997).
112. Id. at 257. The Fourth Circuit questioned the constitutionality of the Migratory
Bird Rule in light of the 1995 Lopez decision discussed infra Part III.B.2. Id. at 255-56.
113. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
114. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
115. 529U.S. 598 (2000).
116. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
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adjacent to navigable bodies of water." 7 The Court concluded that the
Corps had reasonably interpreted its jurisdiction under the CWA.1, 8
The Court made its holding in light of a review of the legislative
history of the CWA." 9  Notably, the Court found that Congress
acquiesced to the Corps's regulations because of a failed attempt by
members of Congress to alter the definition of "navigable waters" and
because of the passage of amendments to the CWA that seem to reflect
congressional understanding of the Corps's interpretation of the Act.
12
The Court also held that Congress clearly intended that the word
"navigable" be of limited import and that federal control extended to
at least some waters not traditionally considered navigable. 121 The
question remaining after the Supreme Court holding was one the Court
had specifically declined to address in Riverside Bayview: whether or not
the Corps had authority to regulate the discharge of fill material into
wetlands not adjacent to bodies of open water. 1
22
2. Recent Limitations on Federal Commerce Clause Power
In United States v. Lopez, 123 the Supreme Court signaled a willing-
ness to set limits on Federal Commerce Clause power, ending a
decades-long trend of the expansion of that power.12  The broad
commerce power long upheld by the Court under the "substantial
effects" doctrine was based on a showing that if an activity affects
commerce even indirectly Congress could invoke federal commerce
117. See id. at 123.
118. Id. at 139.
119. Id. at 131-39.
120. Id. at 135-39. The 1977 amendments to the CWA were considered a "a major
piece of legislation aimed at achieving 'interim improvements within the existing
framework' of the Clean Water Act." Id. at 135 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-139 (1977)).
Amendments actually approved by Congress that the Riverside Bayview Court found
supported the Corps's interpretation of the CWA included changes to the section 404
permit program to allow the states to regulate some discharges of fill material and an
appropriation for a "National Wetlands Inventory to assist the States 'in the
development and operation of programs under [the CWA]."' Id. at 138-39 (quoting 33
U.S.C. § 1288(i)(2) (1994)).
121. Id. at 133. The Court found that the Corps could reasonably interpret the term
"waters" to include wetlands adjacent to traditionally navigable waters based on
Congress's deep concern for protecting water quality and aquatic ecosystems. Id.
122. Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 131 n.8.
123. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
124. Lori J. Warner, The Potential Impact of United States v. Lopez on Environmental
Regulation, 7 DuKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 321, 321-22 (1997). In Lopez, the Court struck
down a federal law that established gun-free zones in schools and provided criminal
penalties for violation of the law. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551-52.
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power because the activity could touch interstate commerce.1 25 In Lopez,
the Court stated that a law would only be upheld when the activity that
it regulates is economic in nature and substantially affects interstate
commerce.'26 An apparently significant component of the Court's
reasoning was the lack of legislative findings to support the govern-
ment's contention that the regulated activity affected commerce.127
In United States v. Morrison,28 however, the Court made it clear
that legislative findings were not the key component required to uphold
legislation under the Commerce Clause.'29 In that case, the Court struck
down the section of the Violence Against Women Act that provided a
federal civil remedy to victims of gender-motivated violence.13 ° The
important elements of the Court's decision were (1) that legislation of
a purely intrastate activity will only be upheld if the activity is
economic in nature;13' (2) that the link between the activity legislated
and its effect on interstate commerce must be sufficiently direct
because otherwise almost any purely intrastate activity could be
regulated as interstate commerce under "but-for" reasoning; 3 2 and, (3)
that a jurisdictional requirement must be present to provide that the
statute does not control unless an instrumentality of interstate com-
merce has been used (i.e., shipping or transportation across state
lines).
33
Legal scholars quickly recognized the possible impact that
Commerce Clause limits could have on Corps's authority over
wetlands.'34 The uncertainty of how the Court might rule on this issue
125. Priolo, supra note 103, at 100-01; Warner, supra note 124, at 321-22.
126. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. Congress based its authority to pass this law on the
impact on interstate commerce of guns in schools. See id. at 562-64.
127. See id. at 562-63.
128. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
129. Id. at 614; see also Jennifer L. Wethington, Note, Violence Against Women Act's
Civil Rights Remedy Exceeds Congress 's Power to Regulate Interstate Commerce, 23 U. ARK.
LrrrLE ROCK L. REv. 485 (2001) (discussing United States v. Morrison and recent
Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
130. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601-07.
131. Id.at610-11.
132. Id. at 614-16.
133. Id. at 613.
134. Warner, supra note 124, at 340-64; see Morrissey, supra note 104, at 141-43.
Recognizing the potential impact of a Supreme Court decision on the environment, six
Illinois environmental groups sent a letter to all the parties involved in Solid Waste in an
attempt to reach a last minute settlement of the issue and to forestall any necessity for
the Supreme Court to rule. William Grady, Groups Seek Settlement of Balefill Suit:




drew significant attention from environmentalists and many other
groups when the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Solid Waste
case.'35 Potentially at issue were not just the future of wetlands
regulation and the CWA, but also states rights, civil rights, and maybe
even the future of congressional and administrative regulatory authority
under the Commerce Clause.1
36
IV. REASONING
In Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 37 the
United States Supreme Court reversed the United States Court of
135. At least four briefs of amici curiae from twenty-nine interested parties were
submitted in support of the Corps, including parties such as the Anti-Defamation
League, National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, NOW Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Human Rights Campaign, National Coalition Against Domestic Violence,
National Urban League, The Association of State Wetland Managers, Environmental
Defense, Natural Resources Defense Council, National Wildlife Federation, World
Wildlife Fund, Defenders of Wildlife, and the States of California, Iowa, Maine, New
Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington. Briefs of Amici Curiae, Solid
Waste, 531 U.S. 159 (No. 99-1178). At least eighteen briefs of amici curiae were filed
by forty-four parties in support of the Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County,
including briefs from the Defenders of Property Rights, American Road and
Transportation Builders Association, Metropolitan Denver Water Authority, National
Association of Home Builders, American Forest & Paper Association, American Iron
and Steel Institute, United States Conference of Mayors, National League of Cities,
Council of State Governments, National Association of Counties, Chamber of
Commerce of the United States, State of Alabama, American Farm Bureau Federation,
National Cattlemen's Beef Association, and National Stone Association. Briefs of
Amici Curiae, Solid Waste (No. 99-1178).
136. See Briefs of Amici Curiae, Solid Waste (No. 99-1178). For both states' rights
and civil rights groups, a decision that upheld the Corps's jurisdiction would confirm
the extension of federal Commerce Clause power over issues considered by some
parties to be purely within the authority of the states. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Solid Waste (No. 99-1178); Brief of Amici
Curiae of Anti-Defamation League et al., Solid Waste (No. 99-1178). Such a decision
would also signal continued deference to the Corps's jurisdiction over certain intrastate
waters and to existing civil rights jurisprudence, much of which is also based on the
Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae of Anti-Defamation League et al.,
Solid Waste (No. 99-1178); Brief of Amici Curiae of Environmental Defense et al., Solid
Waste (No. 99-1178). If based on an improper construction of the CWA, a decision for
SWANCC would curtail federal jurisdiction over many intrastate waters but would not
impact civil rights. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae of Anti-Defamation League et al.,
Solid Waste (No. 99-1178); Brief of Amici Curiae of Environmental Defense et al., Solid
Waste (No. 99-1178). If based on an improper extension of congressional power under
the Commerce Clause, a decision for SWANCC would continue the recent Supreme
Court trend of limiting federal Commerce Clause power and endanger the authority of
the federal government over civil rights and many other areas. See, e.g., Brief of Amici
Curiae of Anti-Defamation League et al., Solid Waste (No. 99-1178).
137. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and held that Congress did not intend
for the jurisdiction of the Corps under section 404(a) of the CWA to
extend to isolated bodies of water such as those defined under 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) and as clarified by the Migratory Bird Rule.' The
majority opinion began by analyzing the CWA to determine if it could
be construed to support the Migratory Bird Rule. 3 9 The Court then
briefly considered the constitutionality of the Migratory Bird Rule




The Court first noted that the stated purpo..? of the CWA is to
"restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity
of the Nation's waters.'' The court pointed out that the statute
specifically preserves the states' rights to administer plans to combat
pollution and to control the use of their own land ,and water
resources.' 42 However, as the Court stated, the statute also gives the
Corps the authority to regulate the discharge of fill material into
"navigable waters" under the section 404(a) permit program. 43 Further,
the Court stated that Congress defined navigable waters as "the waters
of the United States, including the territorial seas."'"
The Court had previously considered the issue of the Corps's
jurisdiction under section 404(a) in United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc. 141 In Solid Waste, the Court reasoned that Riverside Bayview
was distinguishable from Solid Waste because the Riverside Bayview
holding was based upon Congress's tacit approval of Corps's jurisdic-
tion over adjacent wetlands. 46 The Court stated that "[i]t was the
significant nexus between the wetlands and 'navigable waters' that
informed our reading of the CWA in Riverside Bayview Homes,"'147 and
138. Id. at 174. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the 5-4 majority opinion, in which
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. See id. at 162. Justice Stevens
entered a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. See
id. at 174.
139. Id. at 166-68.
140. Id. at 172-74.
141. Id. at 166 (citing 33 U.S.C,?§ 1251(a) (1994)).
142. Id. at 166-67; see supra Part III.A.2 (outlining congressional policy).
143. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 167; 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994).
144. Solid Waste, 531 at 167; 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994).
145. 474 U.S. 121 (1985); see discussion of Riverside Bayview supra Part II1.B. 1.
146. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 167-68; Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 135-39.
147. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 167.
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pointed out that it had explicitly declined to decide if Corps's jurisdic-
tion extended to wetlands not adjacent to navigable waters. 48
Next, the Court examined the evolution of the Corps's interpreta-
tion of the CWA and Congress's response to it.'49 The Court pointed
out that, in the original 1974 interpretation of the CWA, 15° the Corps
did not include isolated bodies of water in its definition of "navigable
waters."'' The Court concluded that this original interpretation was
permissible because there was no conclusive evidence that the Corps
had misconstrued the CWA in 1974.52 Further, the Court said that even
legislative history which indicated that the term "navigable waters"
should "be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation" did
nothing more than point to Congress's intention to exert its commerce
power over navigation. 53
The argument that Congress ratified the Corps's 1977 interpreta-
tion of navigable waters was also considered and discounted by the
Court. The Corps's regulations on which the Migratory Bird Rule is
based were finalized just before Congress passed several amendments
to the CWA in 1977.154 The Court said that Congress's failure to pass
a House bill that would have limited the definition of "navigable
waters" to the waters covered in the Corps's 1974 original interpreta-
tion of the CWA did not give rise to the conclusive interpretation that
Congress intended to support the Corps's 1977 definition of "navigable
waters."' 55 Additionally the Court stated that the connection between
the legislative history of the 1972 CWA and that of the 1977 amend-
ments to the CWA was too distant to allow a true interpretation of the
statute in the face of a plain reading of section 404(a). 5 6 The Court
explained that, in spite of its finding in Riverside Bayview that the 1977
debates on the House bill limiting the definition of "navigable waters"
focused on the issue of wetlands preservation, the debates proved
nothing beyond Congress's desire to continue the Corps's authority
over adjacent wetlands.1
5 7
148. Id; Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 131-32 n.8.
149. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 168-71.
150. 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1) (1974); see supra Part III.A.2.
151. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 168.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 168 n.3; see S. CoNF. REP. No. 92-1236 at 144 (1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3822.
154. See Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 168-69; see also 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2001)
(formerly codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a)(5) (1978)); see supra note 26.
155. See Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 169-70.
156. Id. at 170.
157. Id. at 170-71.
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The Court also rejected the argument that adoption of section
404(g)(1) in the 1977 CWA amendments indicated that Congress
accepted the Corps's expanded definition of "navigable waters."
'158
Section 404(g)(1) authorized a program by which states could
administer the permit program for the discharge of dredge and fill
material for navigable waters subject to federal control under section
404(a) other than those used in interstate or foreign commerce, those
subject to the tide and adjacent wetlands. 5 9 The possible implication of
the Act is that those "other waters" would include isolated bodies of
water and that Congress intended the Corps to have authority over them
until a state successfully applied to take control. 6 The Court rejected
this implication, stating that section 404(g) does not elaborate on what
"other waters" are, and, though "other waters" could include those
waters covered by the 1977 Corps regulations, they could simply
include all waters or wetlands adjacent to "navigable waters.' 61 The
1977 amendments to the CWA also included exemptions from section
404(a) for certain types of discharges. 162 The Corps had referred to the
exemptions, which applied to discharges that are a part of activities
such as the construction of drainage ditches, as support for its proposi-
tion that Congress recognized the Corps's expanded jurisdiction. 63 The
Court rejected this argument on the grounds that the decision to exempt
certain activities from the section 404(a) permit program had no
bearing on the definition of navigable waters."6
According to the Court, Congress's use of the phrase "waters of
the United States" to define "navigable waters" did not constitute a
basis for finding that the term "navigable" no longer had any signifi-
cance. 65 The Court explained that, although the term was of limited
importance, it demonstrated that Congress still had in mind its
traditional authority over waters that were navigable in fact or could be
reasonably made so when it enacted the CWA.166 On this basis, the
Court then declined to hold that isolated bodies of water were included
158. Id. at 171-72; see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
159. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1) (1994).
160. See Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 169.
161. Id. at 171.
162. Id. at 171 n.7; see 33 U.S.C. § 1344(0; see supra note 95 and accompanying
text.
163. See Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 171 n.7; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1344(0.
164. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 171 n.7.




in the Corps's section 404(a) jurisdiction just because they served as a
habitat for migratory birds. '67
Even though the Court began its opinion by declining to address
the constitutional impact of the Migratory Bird Rule, 168 while discuss-
ing the issue of extending Chevron169 deference to the rule, the Court did
briefly consider the constitutional issue. 7 ° The Court noted that two of
its recent decisions limited Congress's broad Commerce Clause
authority:' 7' United States v. Morrison172 and United States v. Lopez. 73 The
Court acknowledged the argument that the Migratory Bird Rule comes
under Congress's power "to regulate intrastate activities that 'substan-
tially affect' interstate commerce" and that over a billion dollars each
year is spent on activities which concern migratory birds, 74 but pointed
out that these assertions raised significant constitutional questions and
that to answer them it would have to evaluate "the precise object or
activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate com-
merce." 175 The Court also found that the rule could affect the state-
federal balance of power by encroaching on traditionally local land use
decisions. 76  The Court did not address these constitutional issues
further because the Court could resolve this case by applying general
principles of statutory construction to the CWA. 177 Thus, in Solid Waste,
the United States Supreme Court held that, as applied to the balefill
site, the Migratory Bird Rule clarification of the Corps's definition of
"navigable waters" exceeded the authority granted to the Corps under
section 404(a) and reversed the Seventh Circuit.
78
167. Id. at 171-72.
168. Id. at 162.
169. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Chevron deference is outside the scope of this note, but the Court did consider and
discard the idea of applying this tenet of statutory construction to the Migratory Bird
Rule. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 173-74. The Chevron rule states that when Congress has
not directly addressed the question at issue, the Court, after reviewing an administrative
interpretation of Congressional intent to determine if it is a permissible construction of
the statute, will give deference to that interpretation instead of imposing its own
construction. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
170. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 173-74.
171. Id. at 173.
172. 529 U.S. 598 (2000); see discussion supra Part III.B.2.
173. 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see discussion supra Part IlI.B.2.
174. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 173.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 173-74.
177. Id.




In his dissent, Justice Stevens indicated that he would have upheld
the Migratory Bird Rule as a valid interpretation of the CWA and as a
valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause authority. 79 Justice
Stevens began his dissent with a brief overview of the origins of the
CWA, the events that led up to its adoption, subsequent case law
interpreting the statute, and a statement that outlined his view of the
majority opinion. 8' Justice Stevens next outlined the history of federal
water regulation leading up to the passage of the CWA in 1972,181
highlighting the gradual shift in water regulation's focus from concerns
over navigability to concerns over pollution.1 12 This modem focus on
pollution, Justice Stevens determined, mandated the expansion through
the CWA of a previously insufficient jurisdictional reach over
navigable waters.1 83  Justice Stevens asserted that congressional
commerce power over navigation had been established by the Court
years earlier.184 Given that fact and the fact that the CWA had nothing
to do with navigation, Justice Stevens questioned why Congress would
intentionally seek to give the CWA the broadest power constitutionally
possible if it did not intend the jurisdiction to be broader than that of
previous water regulation acts.18 5 Justice Stevens also found that
Congress had intended to change the meaning of the term "navigable
waters" when it intentionally dropped the word navigable from the
CWA definition of "navigable waters.1 86 He noted that based on the
history of water regulation, "navigable waters" had become a term of
art that was short for "waters over which federal authority may
properly be asserted.'
' 87
In the second part of the dissent, Justice Stevens focused on the
history of the Corps's jurisdiction and the CWA since 1972, relying
heavily on the Court's findings in Riverside Bayview1 88 He noted that the
179. Id. at 174-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
joined in the dissent. Id. at 175 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 174-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 177-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 178-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 181 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557
(1870); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
185. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 181-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994).
187. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 183-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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1974 Corps regulations garnered significant criticism from the courts
and from the EPA because of their narrow interpretation of the Corps's
jurisdiction under the CWA, 8 9 and that, as a result, the Corps changed
the regulations to allow for broader jurisdiction.' 9° Justice Stevens also
found that, even if Congress did not expand the Corps's authority in
1972, it ratified the expansion in 1977 by its failure to pass a House bill
that would have limited the Corps's authority and by the passage of
additional amendments which indicated that Congress understood and
approved of the Corps's expanded jurisdiction-a finding he said the
Court had already made in Riverside Bayview.19'
After determining that the Corps was construing the CWA
correctly, 192 Justice Stevens addressed the Commerce Clause issue that
the majority opinion did not reach.'93 He distinguished discharging fill
from the criminal activities regulated in United States v. Lopez 94
(possession of guns in schools) and United States v. Morrison95 (gender-
based crimes) because discharging fill is almost always an economic
activity.'96 Justice Stevens noted that no one disputed that migratory
birds would be adversely affected by the discharge of fill into isolated
waters in the aggregate, and that millions of people impacted the
economy by participating in economic activities involving migratory
birds. 197 Finally, Justice Stevens observed that the Migratory Bird Rule
distinguishes between a truly national and a truly local problem. 98 He
also noted that a jurisdictional element necessary for the proper
189. Id. at 183-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 184-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 184-85, 187-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 191 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens criticized the majority's
refusal to extend Chevron deference to the Corps's regulations, noting that the Court had
extended that deference to the same regulations in Riverside Bayview. Id. at 191-92
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 192-97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
194. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
195. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
196. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 193-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 194-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting). United States Congress Office of
Technology Assessment statistics from 1980 indicated that "5.3 million Americans
hunted migratory birds, spending $638 million . . . [m]ore than 100 million Americans
spent almost $14.8 billion . . . to watch and photograph fish and wildlife . . . [and
according to the United States Department of Interior, United States Fish and Wildlife
Service and United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, 1996 National
Survey of Fishing, Hunting, and Wildlife-Associated Recreation] [o]f 17.7 million
birdwatchers, 14.3 million took trips in order to observe, feed, or photograph waterfowl,
and 9.5 million took trips specifically to view other water-associated birds, such as
herons." Id. at 195 n. 17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 195-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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assertion of Congress's commerce power was present in the reference
of Corps's jurisdiction to waters used by migratory birds.'9 9 According
to Justice Stevens, migratory birds and the waters they use are
resources that generate commerce and therefore can be regulated under
Congress's Commerce Clause authority.200 Justice Stevens concluded
by asserting that if Congress can regulate activities causing water and
air pollution under its commerce powers, then it should be able "to




By invalidating the Migratory Bird Rule as an unauthorized
extension of the Corps's powers under the CWA, the Supreme Court
made an important shift in the balance of regulatory power between the
federal and state governments with respect to environmental issues. As
a result, thirty to sixty percent of our nation's wetlands are now at risk
of potentially unsupervised development according to some
estimates.20 2 At least one state is working to fill the gaps created by
Solid Waste,203 but many states have little or no wetlands protection
legislation in place.2° While ultimately the states might be better
environmental regulators than the federal government, at this juncture,
most states are ill-equipped to implement and oversee sophisticated
environmental regulations.
This result seems so clearly contrary to what Congress intended
when it passed the CWA205 that it gives strong support to the dissent's
argument that the majority had misread the plain language of the
statute. The dissent's opinion is further bolstered by the extent of Solid
Waste's potential impact on the Corps's jurisdiction over isolated
199. Id. at 196 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
202. E.g., Jon Kusler, Association of State Wetland Managers, Inc., The SWANCC
Decision and State Regulation of Wetlands 1 (2001) (memorandum), available at
http://www.aswm.org/swancc/aswm-int.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2001).
203. See WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 281.22, 281.36 (West Supp. 2001). The State of
Wisconsin recently passed an "isolated wetlands" law aimed at preserving the status
quo before the Solid Waste opinion. Id.
204. See Robert Meltz & Claudia Copeland, Congressional Research Service Report
for Congress, The Supreme Court Addresses Corps of Engineers Jurisdiction Over
"Isolated Waters": The SWANCC Decision (Feb. 16, 2001), available at http://www.
cnie.org/nle/rsk-56.html.
205. See supra Part III.A.2 for a discussion of the policy goals of the CWA.
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wetlands-a jurisdiction that Congress has thoroughly debated and
failed to take action on since the 1970s.206 The majority's assertion that
this opinion does not contradict its findings in Riverside Bayview
highlights the misinterpretation by the Court.
The Court's holding invalidated only the Migratory Bird Rule as
it applied to SWANCC's balefill site and not the broader Corps's
definition of "waters of the United States," but in dicta the Court
seemed to indicate that in every situation the rule and the definition
were both unauthorized. 27 Thus, the Court's limited holding on the
Migratory Bird Rule's validity may have far-reaching impacts. One
federal district court has already affirmatively stated that Solid Waste
does invalidate the entire definition promulgated by the Corps. 28 In that
case, the district court went so far as to say that the Supreme Court had
relied on the Corps's 1974 definition of "waters of the United
States.,209 However, it is not clear that the Court relied on the 1974
definition, especially when the Court took special pains to reaffirm its
Riverside Bayview holding that adjacent wetlands were covered under
Corps's jurisdiction.2" ° Unmistakably, the issue is far from settled and
will likely be argued in the courts for years to come, creating even
greater uncertainty in the already uncertain area of environmental
regulation.
The Corps's narrow interpretation of the Solid Waste decision,
outlined in a memorandum from the legal counsel of both the Corps
and the EPA, which reminded Corps's field offices "that most CWA
jurisdiction remains basically intact after the [Solid Waste] decision,"
will undoubtedly fuel the controversy over the "waters of the United
States" definition.2 1 The memorandum emphasized that the Corps still
has jurisdiction over isolated wetlands and instructed administrators to
contact agency legal counsel about connections with interstate
commerce, other than migratory birds, that might support the assertion
of Corps's jurisdiction. t 2 The Solid Waste opinion indicates, though it
206. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 183-92.
207. Id. at 170-71.
208. United States v. Interstate Gen. Co., 152 F. Supp. 843, 847 (D. Md. 2001)
(mem.).
209. Id. at 846.
210. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 167-68.
211. Memorandum from Gary S. Guzy, General Counsel, United States EPA &
Robert M. Andersen, Chief Counsel, United States Army Corps of Engineers (January
19, 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/swancc-ogc.html (last




does not explicitly hold, that no interstate commerce connection will
uphold jurisdiction over isolated wetlands under the Court's reading of
the CWA.213 The court challenges that are sure to follow will decide the
issue.
Also still up in the air after the decision is whether or not Corps's
jurisdiction over isolated wetlands based on a Commerce Clause
connection such as migratory birds would be valid if Congress
amended the CWA to provide for such jurisdiction. The Court
suggested that the Commerce Clause issue would raise significant
constitutional and federalism questions. Nevertheless, the Court dodged
both issues in this case, though it did hint that the Migratory Bird Rule
might not survive a constitutional challenge when it stated that the rule
significantly impinges on "the States' traditional and primary power
over land and water use. 214 If Congress did amend the CWA to expand
the Corps's jurisdiction, the Court would likely have to face the issue
head-on. The Court's recent trend of limiting the Commerce Clause
power suggests that the Court might use another CWA Commerce
Clause challenge to further rein in the federal commerce power.2 5 To
do that, however, would be a serious step that might impact other
decisions by the Court that are based on expanded federal commerce
power. For instance, much of the landmark civil rights jurisprudence
of the twentieth century is just one of the potentially affected areas.
The Court recently declined to consider such a step in Gibbs v.
Babbit.216 In that case, plaintiffs directly challenged the Federal
Endangered Species Act-which prohibited the taking of red wolves-
based on Congress's Commerce Clause authority. 217 The district court
and the Fourth Circuit both declined to invalidate the Act and held that
taking a red wolf was legitimately prohibited under the Commerce
Clause.2 8 The Supreme Court denied plaintiffs' request for certiorari.21 9
Ultimately, the Court's decision in Solid Waste has done little to
mitigate the controversy surrounding federal environmental regulation
under the CWA; the decision leaves the future of federal environmental
legislation as a whole and wetlands protection in particular hanging in
213. Solid Waste, 531 U.S. at 168 n.3, 170-71.
214. See id. at 174.
215. See Meltz & Copeland, supra note 204, at 14-18.








the balance. No ideal solution presents itself. For environmentalists, the
ideal solution to the problem is for Congress to pass legislation that
would confirm a broad-based jurisdiction over "waters of the United
States" by the Corps.22' Even though such legislation might ultimately
face a Commerce Clause challenge, it would at least maintain the status
quo and allow lawmakers time to consider all of their options.
Another solution might appeal to those who want to protect the
environment but feel that the federal government's power has en-
croached too far. For instance, Congress could enact legislation that
would require the states to conduct some type of permitting program for
the dredge and fill of isolated wetlands and to provide federal funds to
support those programs.221 If neither of these things happens, to protect
wetlands the states will need to find alternate ways to bridge the gaps
in environmental regulation left as a result of Solid Waste.
As the above discussion demonstrates, the legacy that Solid Waste
leaves is the uncertainty that now surrounds the Corps's authority over
isolated wetlands and environmental regulations in general. This note
does not even touch on the other EPA and Corps programs that are
impacted by the Solid Waste ruling.222 These important issues need to be
addressed so that the vacuum in regulatory control left by the Court's
decision is filled or not filled in a way that truly reflects the will of the
majority of the American people rather than the interests of any one
minority group.
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